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Abstract
Logic programs under the stable model semantics, or answer-set programs, provide an expressive
rule-based knowledge representation framework, featuring a formal, declarative and well-understood
semantics. However, handling the evolution of rule bases is still a largely open problem. The AGM
framework for belief change was shown to give inappropriate results when directly applied to logic
programs under a non-monotonic semantics such as the stable models. The approaches to address
this issue, developed so far, proposed update semantics based on manipulating the syntactic structure
of programs and rules.
More recently, AGM revision has been successfully applied to a significantly more expressive
semantic characterisation of logic programs based on SE-models. This is an important step, as it
changes the focus from the evolution of a syntactic representation of a rule base to the evolution of
its semantic content.
In this paper, we borrow results from the area of belief update to tackle the problem of updating
(instead of revising) answer-set programs. We prove a representation theorem which makes it pos-
sible to constructively define any operator satisfying a set of postulates derived from Katsuno and
Mendelzon’s postulates for belief update. We define a specific operator based on this theorem, ex-
amine its computational complexity and compare the behaviour of this operator with syntactic rule
update semantics from the literature. Perhaps surprisingly, we uncover a serious drawback of all rule
update operators based on Katsuno and Mendelzon’s approach to update and on SE-models.
KEYWORDS: belief update, answer-set programs, rule update, SE-models, support, literal inertia
1 Introduction
Answer-Set Programming (ASP) (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Baral 2003) is now widely
recognised as a valuable approach to knowledge representation and reasoning, mostly due
to its simple and well-understood declarative semantics, its rich expressive power, and the
existence of efficient implementations.
However, the dynamic character of many applications that can benefit from ASP calls
for the development of ways to deal with the evolution of answer-set programs and the
inconsistencies that may arise.
∗ This is an extended version of (Slota and Leite 2010).
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The problems associated with knowledge evolution have been extensively studied, over
the years, by different research communities, namely in the context of Classical Logic, and
in the context of Logic Programming.
The former have been inspired, to a large extent, by the seminal work of Alchourro´n,
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (AGM) who proposed a set of desirable properties of belief
change operators, now called AGM postulates (Alchourro´n et al. 1985). Subsequently, up-
date and revision have been distinguished as two very related but ultimately different be-
lief change operations (Keller and Winslett 1985; Winslett 1990; Katsuno and Mendelzon
1991). While revision deals with incorporating new information about a static world, up-
date takes place when changes occurring in a dynamic world are recorded. Katsuno and
Mendelzon formulated a separate set of postulates for update, now known as KM postu-
lates.
Both AGM and KM postulates were later studied in the context of Logic Programming,
only to find that their formulations based on a non-monotonic semantics, such as the an-
swer sets, are inappropriate (Eiter et al. 2002). Like many belief change operators, earlier
methods used to tackle rule updates were based on literal inertia (Alferes and Pereira 1996)
but proved not sufficiently expressive. This led to the development of rule update semantics
based on different intuitions, principles and constructions, when compared to their classi-
cal counterparts. For example, the introduction of the causal rejection principle (Leite and
Pereira 1998) motivated a line of work on several rule update semantics (Alferes et al.
2000; Eiter et al. 2002; Leite 2003; Alferes et al. 2005; Osorio and Cuevas 2007), all of
them with a strong syntactic flavour. Other approaches tackle rule updates by employing
syntactic transformations and other methods, such as abduction (Sakama and Inoue 2003),
forgetting (Zhang and Foo 2005), prioritisation (Zhang 2006), preferences (Delgrande et al.
2007), or dependencies on default assumptions (Sˇefra´nek 2006; Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-
Isberner 2010; Sˇefra´nek 2011).
Though useful in a number of practical scenarios (Alferes et al. 2003; Saias and Quaresma
2004; Siska 2006; Ilic et al. 2008; Slota et al. 2011), it turned out that most of these se-
mantics exhibit undesirable behaviour. For example, except for the semantics proposed in
(Alferes et al. 2005; Sˇefra´nek 2011), a tautological update may influence the result under
all of these semantics, a behaviour that is highly undesirable when considering knowledge
updates. Other kinds of irrelevant updates are even more problematic and subject of ongo-
ing research (Sˇefra´nek 2006; Sˇefra´nek 2011). But more important, the common feature of
all of these semantics is that they make heavy use of the syntactic structure of programs
and rules, making any analysis of their semantic properties a daunting task.
Recently, AGM revision was reformulated in the context of Logic Programming in a
manner analogous to belief revision in classical propositional logic, and specific revision
operators for logic programs were investigated (Delgrande et al. 2008; Osorio and Cuevas
2007). Central to this novel approach are SE-models (Turner 2003) which provide a mono-
tonic semantic characterisation of logic programs that is strictly more expressive than the
answer-set semantics. Furthermore, two programs have the same set of SE-models if and
only if they are strongly equivalent (Lifschitz et al. 2001), which means that programs
P,Q with the same set of SE-models can be modularly replaced by one another, even in
the presence of additional rules, without affecting the resulting answer sets.
Indeed, these results constitute an important breakthrough in the research of answer-set
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program evolution. They change the focus from the syntactic representation of a program,
where not all rules and literal occurrences are necessarily relevant to the meaning of the
program as a whole, to its semantic content, i.e. to the information that the program is
intended to represent.
In this paper, we follow a similar path, but to tackle the problem of answer-set program
updates, instead of revision as in (Delgrande et al. 2008).
Using SE-models, we adapt the KM postulates to answer-set program updates and prove
a representation theorem that provides a constructive characterisation of rule update op-
erators satisfying the postulates, making it possible to define and evaluate any operator
satisfying the postulates using an intuitive construction. We show how this constructive
characterisation can be used by defining a concrete answer-set program update operator
that can be seen as a counterpart of Winslett’s belief update operator (Winslett 1990) which
satisfies the KM postulates and is commonly used in the literature.
However, while investigating the operator’s properties, we uncover a serious drawback
which, as it turns out, extends to all answer-set program update operators based on SE-mod-
els and Katsuno and Mendelzon’s approach to updates. This finding is very important as
it guides the research on updates of answer-set programs away from the purely semantic
approach materialised in AGM and KM postulates or, alternatively, to the development of
semantic characterisations of answer-set programs, richer than SE-models, that are appro-
priate for describing their dynamic behaviour.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the for-
mal concepts that are necessary throughout the rest of the paper. Section 3 contains the
reformulation of KM postulates for logic program updates and the representation theorem
that establishes a general constructive characterisation of rule update operators obeying
the postulates. We also show how this theorem can be used by defining a specific rule up-
date operator that satisfies the postulates and we examine the computational complexity of
query answering for this operator. In Section 4 we further analyse the previously defined
operator and establish that all semantic rule update operators based on SE-models exhibit
an undesired behaviour. We summarise our findings in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
We consider a propositional language over a finite set of propositional variables A and the
usual set of propositional connectives to form propositional formulae. An objective literal
is either an atom p or its negation ¬p. A Horn clause is a disjunction of at most one atom
and zero or more negated atoms; a Horn formula is a conjunction of Horn clauses.
A (propositional) interpretation is any subset of A and the set of all interpretations is
I = 2A. We use the standard semantics for propositional formulae and denote the set of
models of a formula φ by JφK. We also write J |= φ if J ∈ JφK. We say that a formula φ
is complete if JφK is a singleton set. For formulae φ, ψ we say that φ is equivalent to ψ,
denoted by φ ≡ ψ, if JφK = Jψ K, and that φ entails ψ, denoted by φ |= ψ, if JφK ⊆ Jψ K.
As we are dealing with the finite case, every knowledge base can be expressed by a single
formula.
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2.1 Belief Update
Update is a belief change operation that brings a knowledge base up to date when the
world described by it changes (Keller and Winslett 1985; Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991).
Formally, a belief update operator is a function that takes two formulae, representing the
original knowledge base and its update, as arguments and returns a formula representing
the updated knowledge base. To further specify the desired properties of update operators,
the following eight postulates for a belief update operator  and formulae φ, ψ, µ, ν were
proposed in (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991):
(B1) φ  µ |= µ.
(B2) If φ |= µ, then φ  µ ≡ φ.
(B3) If JφK 6= ∅ and JµK 6= ∅, then Jφ  µK 6= ∅.
(B4) If φ ≡ ψ and µ ≡ ν, then φ  µ ≡ ψ  ν.
(B5) (φ  µ) ∧ ν |= φ  (µ ∧ ν).
(B6) If φ  µ |= ν and φ  ν |= µ, then φ  µ ≡ φ  ν.
(B7) If φ is complete, then (φ  µ) ∧ (φ  ν) |= φ  (µ ∨ ν).
(B8) (φ ∨ ψ)  µ ≡ (φ  µ) ∨ (ψ  µ).
Katsuno and Mendelzon also proved an important representation theorem that makes it
possible to define and evaluate any operator satisfying these postulates using an intuitive
construction. It is based on treating the models of a knowledge base as possible real states
of the modelled world. An update of an original knowledge base φ is performed by modi-
fying each of its models as little as possible to make it consistent with new information in
the update µ, obtaining a new set of interpretations – the models of the updated knowledge
base. More formally,
Jφ  µK = ⋃
I∈JφK incorporate(JµK, I) ,
where incorporate(M, I) returns the members ofM closer to I . A natural way of defining
incorporate(M, I) is by assigning an order ≤I over I to each interpretation I and taking
the minima ofM w.r.t. ≤I , i.e. incorporate(M, I) = min(M,≤I). In the following we
first formally establish the concept of an order assignment; thereafter we define when an
update operator is characterised by such an assignment.
Given a set S, a preorder over S is a reflexive and transitive binary relation over S; a
strict preorder over S is an irreflexive and transitive binary relation over S; a partial order
over S is a preorder over S that is antisymmetric. Given a preorder ≤ over S, we denote
by < the strict preorder induced by ≤, i.e. s < t if and only if s ≤ t and not t ≤ s. For
any subset T of S, the set of minimal elements of T w.r.t. ≤ is
min(T ,≤) = { s ∈ T | ¬∃t ∈ T : t < s } .
Definition 1 (Order assignment)
Let S be a set. A preorder assignment over S is any function ω that assigns a preorder ≤sω
over S to each s ∈ S. A partial order assignment over S is any preorder assignment ω
over S such that ≤sω is a partial order over S for every s ∈ S.
The Rise and Fall of Semantic Rule Updates Based on SE-Models 5
Definition 2 (Belief update operator characterised by an order assignment)
Let  be a belief update operator and ω a preorder assignment over I. We say that  is
characterised by ω if for all formulae φ, µ,
Jφ  µK = ⋃
I∈JφK min
(JµK,≤Iω) . (1)
A natural condition to impose on the assigned orders is that every interpretation be the
closest to itself. This is captured by the notion of a faithful order assignment:
Definition 3 (Faithful order assignment (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991))
A preorder assignment ω over I is faithful if for every interpretation I the following con-
dition is satisfied:
For every J ∈ I with J 6= I it holds that I <Iω J .
The representation theorem of (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991) states that operators char-
acterised by faithful order assignments are exactly those that satisfy the KM postulates.
Theorem 4 (Representation theorem for belief updates (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1991))
Let  be a belief update operator. Then the following conditions are equivalent:
a) The operator  satisfies conditions (B1) – (B8).
b) The operator  is characterised by a faithful preorder assignment.
c) The operator  is characterised by a faithful partial order assignment.
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s results provide a framework for belief update operators, each
specified on the semantic level by a faithful partial order assignment over I. The most in-
fluential instance of this framework is the Possible Models Approach (Keller and Winslett
1985; Winslett 1990), also referred to as Winslett’s belief update semantics, based on min-
imising the set of atoms whose truth value changes when an interpretation is updated.
Formally, Winslett’s partial order assignment W is defined for all interpretations I , J , K
by
J ≤IW K if and only if (J ÷ I) ⊆ (K ÷ I) ,
where ÷ denotes set-theoretic symmetric difference. It is not difficult to verify that W is
a faithful partial order assignment, so it follows from Theorem 4 that any belief update
operator  characterised by W satisfies postulates (B1) – (B8). Note that there is a whole
class of operators characterised by W that differ in the syntactic representation of updated
belief bases. Insofar as we are interested in the semantic properties of Winslett’s updates,
it follows from (B4) that it does not matter which operator from this class we pick. This is
illustrated in the following example:
Example 5 (Winslett’s belief update semantics)
Consider the knowledge base φ = (p∧ (q ≡ r)) and the update µ = (q ∨ r) over the set of
atoms A = { p, q, r }. Their sets of models are as follows:
JφK = { { p } , { p, q, r } } ,JµK = { { q } , { r } , { q, r } , { p, q } , { p, r } , { p, q, r } } .
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When performing an update of φ by µ under Winslett’s update semantics, equation (1)
applies as follows:
Jφ  µK = ⋃
I∈JφK min
(JµK,≤IW) = min(JµK,≤{ p }W ) ∪min(JµK,≤{ p,q,r }W ) .
The models of µ that “differ least” from { p }, in the sense of the order assignment W,
are { p, q } and { p, r }. Furthermore, since W is faithful, the unique model of µ that is
minimally distant from { p, q, r } is { p, q, r } itself. Consequently,
Jφ  µK = { { p, q } , { p, r } , { p, q, r } } .
Note that from the syntactic viewpoint, φ  µ can be any formula with the above set of
models. Thus, it may for example be the case that φ  µ = (p ∧ (q ∨ r)) while for another
operator ′, also characterised by W, φ ′ µ = ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r)).
2.2 Computational Complexity of Winslett’s Update Semantics
Computationally, query answering for Winlett’s operator, i.e. the problem of deciding
whether φ  µ |= ψ, where  is characterised by W, belongs to the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy (Eiter and Gottlob 1992). We formulate this result formally as it
later facilitates the study of computational complexity of a newly introduced rule update
operator.
Assuming that the reader is familiar with the classes NP and co-NP, we briefly introduce
the polynomial hierarchy (Meyer and Stockmeyer 1972; Stockmeyer 1976). Its definition
relies on the notion of an oracle: An oracle for a class of decision problems C can decide
any problem in C in just one step of computation. We denote by NPC the class of de-
cision problems solvable in polynomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machine that
can make calls to an oracle for C. The classes ΣPi and Π
P
i of the polynomial hierarchy are
defined inductively as follows: ΣP0 = Π
P
0 = P and for all i ≥ 0,
ΣPi+1 = NP
ΣPi and ΠPi+1 = co-Σ
P
i+1 .
In the general case, query answering for Winslett’s updates is ΠP2 -complete.
Theorem 6 (Part of Theorem 6.4 in (Eiter and Gottlob 1992))
Let  be a belief update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether φ  µ |= ψ for
formulae φ, µ, ψ is ΠP2 -complete. Hardness holds even if φ is a conjunction of atoms and
ψ is one of the atoms in that conjunction.
However, when dealing only with Horn formulae, the problem drops to the first level of the
polynomial hierarchy:
Theorem 7 (Part of Theorem 7.2 in (Eiter and Gottlob 1992))
Let  be a belief update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether φ  µ |= ψ for
Horn formulae φ, µ, ψ is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds even if φ is a conjunction of
objective literals and ψ is one of the literals in that conjunction.
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2.3 Logic Programming
We define the syntax and semantics of logic programs, borrowing some of the notation
used in (Delgrande et al. 2008).
An atom is any p ∈ A. A literal is an atom p or its default negation ∼p. Given a set of
literals S, we introduce the following notation:
S+ = { p ∈ A | p ∈ S } , S− = { p ∈ A | ∼p ∈ S } ,
∼S = { ∼p | p ∈ S ∩A } , ¬S = { ¬p | p ∈ S ∩A } .
A rule is a pair of sets of literals pi = (H(pi), B(pi)). We say that H(pi) is the head of pi
and B(pi) is the body of pi. Usually, for convenience, we write pi as
H(pi)+;∼H(pi)− ← B(pi)+,∼B(pi)−. (2)
Operators ‘;’ and ‘,’ express disjunctive and conjunctive connectives, respectively. A rule
is called a fact if its head contains exactly one literal and its body is empty. A fact is
positive if the literal in its head is an atom. A rule is non-disjunctive if its head contains
at most one literal; definite if it is non-disjunctive and its head and body contain only
atoms. A program is a set of rules. A program is non-disjunctive if all rules inside it are
non-disjunctive; definite if all rules inside it are definite.
Turning to the semantics, we need to define answer sets and SE-models of a logic pro-
gram. We start by defining the more basic notion of a (classical) model of a logic program.
For every rule pi of the form (2) we denote by κ(pi) the propositional formula∧
(B(pi)+ ∪ ¬B(pi)−) ⊃
∨
(H(pi)+ ∪ ¬H(pi)−) .
For a program P, κ(P) = ∧pi∈P κ(pi). An interpretation J is a model of a program P,
denoted by J |= P, if J |= κ(P). We say that P is consistent if it has some classical
model.
An interpretation J is an answer set of a program P if it is a subset-minimal model of
the reduct of P relative to J :
PJ = {H(pi)+ ← B(pi)+. ∣∣ pi ∈ P ∧H(pi)− ⊆ J ∧B(pi)− ∩ J = ∅ } .
SE-models (Turner 2003), based on the non-classical logic of Here-and-There (Heyting
1930; Łukasiewicz 1941; Pearce 1997), provide a monotonic characterisation of logic pro-
grams that is expressive enough to capture both their classical models and answer sets. We
use SE-models in the following sections to reformulate the KM postulates for belief update
in the context of rule updates.
Intuitively, each SE-interpretation assigns one of three truth values to every atom. Tech-
nically it consists of a pair of propositional interpretations, the first containing atoms that
are true and the second containing atoms that are not false. Formally:
Definition 8 (SE-interpretation (Turner 2003))
An SE-interpretation is a pair of interpretations (I, J) such that I ⊆ J . The set of all
SE-interpretations is denoted by X.
SE-models themselves are defined by referring to the program reduct used to define answer
sets above.
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Definition 9 (SE-model (Turner 2003))
Let P be a program. An SE-interpretation (I, J) is an SE-model of P if J |= P and
I |= PJ . The set of all SE-models of P is denoted by JP KSE and we write (I, J) |= P if
(I, J) ∈ JP KSE.
Note that J |= P if and only if (J, J) ∈ JP KSE, so SE-models capture the classical models
of a program. And just like classical models, the set of SE-models of a program is mono-
tonic, i.e. larger programs have smaller sets of SE-models. This is one of the important
differences between SE-models and the non-monotonic answer sets.
Nevertheless, a program’s answer sets, just like its classical models, can be extracted
from its set of SE-models: An interpretation J is an answer set of P if and only if (J, J) ∈JP KSE and no (I, J) ∈ JP KSE with I ( J exists. This implies that programs with the same
set of SE-models also have the same answer sets. Moreover, when such programs are aug-
mented with the same set of rules, the resulting programs still have the same answer sets.
In many situations such a property is desirable as it allows one program to be modularly
replaced by another one, even in the presence of additional rules, without affecting the re-
sulting answer sets. It is typically referred to as strong equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 2001)
and the relationship between SE-models and strong equivalence is formally captured as
follows:
Proposition 10 (SE-models and strong equivalence (Turner 2003))
Let P,Q be programs. It holds that JP KSE = JQKSE if and only if for every programR, the
answer sets of P ∪R and Q∪R are the same.
In other words, SE-models exactly capture the concept of strong equivalence. This also
explains the origin of the name SE-models – “SE” stands for strong equivalence. Based on
this result, we define strong equivalence and entailment as follows:
Definition 11 (Strong equivalence and strong entailment)
Let P, Q be programs. We say that P is strongly equivalent to Q, denoted by P ≡SE Q, ifJP KSE = JQKSE, and that P strongly entails Q, denoted by P |=SE Q, if JP KSE ⊆ JQKSE.
An important distinguishing property of SE-models that we will need to carefully con-
sider in the following sections is that whenever a program P has the SE-model (I, J),
it also has the SE-model (J, J). More generally, any set of SE-interpretations with this
property is referred to as well-defined (Delgrande et al. 2008).
Definition 12 (Well-defined set of SE-interpretations (Delgrande et al. 2008))
For every SE-interpretation X = (I, J) we denote by X∗ the SE-interpretation (J, J).
A set of SE-interpretationsM is well-defined if for every SE-interpretation X , X ∈ M
implies X∗ ∈M.
In fact, as pinpointed in the following result, not only is the set of SE-models of a
program well-defined, but every well-defined set of SE-interpretations is also the set of
SE-models of some program.
The Rise and Fall of Semantic Rule Updates Based on SE-Models 9
Proposition 13 (Delgrande et al. 2008)
A set of SE-interpretationsM is well-defined if and only ifM = JP KSE for some program
P.
As a consequence, whenever I ( J , there is no program that has the single SE-model
X = (I, J), though there is a program that has the pair of SE-models X , X∗. The follow-
ing notion of a basic program is thus analogous to the concept of a complete formula that
is used in the formulation of belief update postulate (B7).
Definition 14 (Basic program)
We say that a program P is basic if JP KSE = {X,X∗ } for some SE-interpretation X .
Note that a program is basic if either it has a unique SE-model (J, J), or a pair of SE-mod-
els (I, J) and (J, J). In the former case, the program exactly determines the truth values
of all atoms – the atoms in J are true and the remaining atoms are false. In the latter case,
the program makes atoms in I true, the atoms in J \ I may either be undefined or true, as
long as they all have the same truth value, and the remaining atoms are false.
3 Semantic Rule Updates Based on SE-Models
With the necessary concepts defined, we are ready to step forward and tailor the belief up-
date postulates and operators to the context of logic programs viewed through their sets of
SE-models. Since SE-models provide a monotonic characterisation of logic programs, the
analysis provided in (Eiter et al. 2002), which showed KM postulates not appropriate for
use with non-monotonic semantics, no longer applies. In the following we reformulate the
belief update postulates as well as a constructive characterisation of semantic rule update
operators, and finally show a counterpart of the representation theorem for belief updates.
The studied operators are semantic in their very nature and in line with KM postulates,
in contrast with the traditional syntax-based approaches to rule updates (Leite and Pereira
1998; Alferes et al. 2000; Eiter et al. 2002; Sakama and Inoue 2003; Zhang and Foo 2005;
Alferes et al. 2005; Zhang 2006; Delgrande et al. 2007; Sˇefra´nek 2011).
Similarly as in the case of belief updates, we liberally define a rule update operator as
any function that takes two inputs, the original program and its update, and returns the
updated program.
Definition 15 (Rule update operator)
A rule update operator is a binary function on the set of all programs.
In order to reformulate postulates (B1) – (B8) for logic programs under the SE-model
semantics, we first need to specify what a conjunction and disjunction of logic programs
is. To this end, we introduce program conjunction and disjunction operators. These are
required to assign, to each pair of programs, a program whose set of SE-models is the
intersection and union, respectively, of the sets of SE-models of argument programs.
Definition 16 (Program conjunction and disjunction)
A binary operator ∧˙ on the set of all programs is a program conjunction operator if for all
programs P, Q, JP ∧˙ QKSE = JP KSE ∩ JQKSE .
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A binary operator ∨˙ on the set of all programs is a program disjunction operator if for all
programs P, Q, JP ∨˙ QKSE = JP KSE ∪ JQKSE .
In the following we assume that some program conjunction and disjunction operators ∧˙,
∨˙ are given. Note that the program conjunction operator may simply return the union of
argument programs; it is the same as the expansion operator defined in (Delgrande et al.
2008). A program disjunction operator can be defined by translating the argument pro-
grams into the logic of Here-and-There (Heyting 1930; Łukasiewicz 1941; Pearce 1997),
taking their disjunction and transforming the resulting formula back into a logic program
(using results from (Cabalar and Ferraris 2007)).
The final obstacle before we can proceed with introducing the new postulates is the fol-
lowing: We need to substitute the notion of a complete formula used in (B7) with a suitable
class of logic programs. It turns out that the notion of a basic program, as introduced in
Definition 14, is a natural candidate for this purpose. While a complete formula is defined
as having a unique model, a program is basic if it has either a unique SE-model (J, J), or
a pair of SE-models (I, J) and (J, J). The latter case needs to be allowed in order to make
the new postulate applicable to SE-interpretations (I, J) with I ( J because no program
has the single SE-model (I, J) (c.f. Proposition 13).
The following are the reformulated postulates for a rule update operator⊕ and programs
P, Q, U , V:
(P1)SE P ⊕ U |=SE U .
(P2)SE If P |=SE U , then P ⊕ U ≡SE P.
(P3)SE If JP KSE 6= ∅ and JU KSE 6= ∅, then JP ⊕ U KSE 6= ∅.
(P4)SE If P ≡SE Q and U ≡SE V , then P ⊕ U ≡SE Q⊕ V .
(P5)SE (P ⊕ U) ∧˙ V |=SE P ⊕ (U ∧˙ V).
(P6)SE If P ⊕ U |=SE V and P ⊕ V |=SE U , then P ⊕ U ≡SE P ⊕ V .
(P7)SE If P is basic, then (P ⊕ U) ∧˙ (P ⊕ V) |=SE P ⊕ (U ∨˙ V).
(P8)SE (P ∨˙ Q)⊕ U ≡SE (P ⊕ U) ∨˙ (Q⊕ U).
Now we turn to a constructive characterisation of rule update operators satisfying condi-
tions (P1)SE – (P8)SE. Analogically to belief updates, it is based on an order assignment, but
this time over the set of all SE-interpretations X. Since the set of SE-models of a program
must be well-defined, not every order assignment characterises a rule update operator. We
thus additionally define well-defined order assignments as those that do.
Definition 17 (Rule update operator characterised by an order assignment)
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator and ω a preorder assignment over X. We say that ⊕ is
characterised by ω if for all programs P, U ,
JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) .
We say that a preorder assignment over X is well-defined if some rule update operator is
characterised by it.
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Similarly as with belief update, we require the order assignment to be faithful, i.e. to
consider each SE-interpretation the closest to itself.
Definition 18 (Faithful order assignment)
A preorder assignment ω over X is faithful if for every SE-interpretation X the following
condition is satisfied:
For every Y ∈ X with Y 6= X it holds that X <Xω Y .
Interestingly, faithful assignments characterise the same class of operators as the larger
class of semi-faithful assignments, defined as follows:
Definition 19 (Semi-faithful order assignment)
A preorder assignment ω over X is semi-faithful if for every SE-interpretation X the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied:
1. For every Y ∈ X with Y 6= X and Y 6= X∗, either X <Xω Y or X∗ <Xω Y .
2. If X∗ ≤Xω X , then X ≤Xω X∗.
Finally, we require the preorder assignment to satisfy one further condition, related to
the well-definedness of sets of SE-models of every program. It can be seen as the natural
semantic counterpart of (P7)SE.
Definition 20 (Organised order assignment)
A preorder assignment ω is organised if for all SE-interpretations X , Y and all well-
defined sets of SE-interpretationsM,N the following condition is satisfied:
If Y ∈ min(M,≤Xω ) ∪min(M,≤X
∗
ω ) and Y ∈ min(N ,≤Xω ) ∪min(N ,≤X
∗
ω ),
then Y ∈ min(M∪N ,≤Xω ) ∪min(M∪N ,≤X
∗
ω ).
Now we are ready to formulate the main result of this section:
Theorem 21 (Representation theorem for rule updates)
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator. The following conditions are equivalent:
a) The operator ⊕ satisfies conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE.
b) The operator ⊕ is characterised by a semi-faithful and organised preorder assignment.
c) The operator ⊕ is characterised by a faithful and organised partial order assignment.
Proof
See Appendix A, page 25.
This theorem provides a constructive characterisation of rule update operators satisfying
the defined postulates. It facilitates the analysis of their properties, both semantic as well as
computational. Note also that it implies that the larger class of semi-faithful and organised
preorder assignments is equivalent to the smaller class of faithful and organised partial
order assignments. Furthermore, it offers a strategy for defining operators satisfying the
postulates that can be directly applied whenever an order assignment is known or can be
approximated. This strategy is also complete in the sense that, up to strong equivalence, all
operators satisfying the postulates can be characterised and distinguished by applying this
strategy.
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In what follows, we define a specific update operator based on the ideas underlying
Winslett’s update semantics (Keller and Winslett 1985; Winslett 1990) defined Section 2.
Similarly as was argued in (Delgrande et al. 2008), since we are working with well-defined
sets of SE-interpretations, preference needs to be given to their second component. Thus,
we extend the assignment W to all SE-interpretations X = (I, J), Y = (K1, L1), Z =
(K2, L2) as follows: Y ≤XW Z if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. (L1 ÷ J) ⊆ (L2 ÷ J);
2. If (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J), then (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
Intuitively, first we compare the differences between the second components of Y and Z
w.r.t. X . If they are equal, we compare the differences between the first components of
Y and Z w.r.t. X , but now ignoring the differences between the second components. A
concrete illustration of these comparisons is presented next:
Example 22 (Assignment W for SE-interpretations)
Let the SE-interpretations X , Y , Z1, Z2, Z3 be as follows:1
X = (I, J) = (p, pq) , Y = (K,L) = (p, pr) ,
Z1 = (K1, L1) = (p, prs) , Z2 = (K2, L2) = (∅, pr) , Z3 = (K3, L3) = (pr, pr) .
We can see that (L ÷ J) = { q, r } ( { q, r, s } = (L1 ÷ J), so it follows that Y ≤XW Z1
holds and it is not the case that Z1 ≤XW Y . Thus, Y <XW Z1.
On the other hand, (L÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J) = (L3 ÷ J) = ∆ = { q, r }, so Y and Z2 can
only be distinguished based on the second condition. Furthermore, we have (K÷I)\∆ =
∅ ( { p } = (K2 ÷ I) \∆. Similarly as before, we obtain Y <XW Z2.
A slightly different case occurs with Z3 because (K3÷ I) \∆ = { r } \ { q, r } = ∅ and
it follows that both Y ≤XW Z3 and Z3 ≤XW Y hold, despite the fact that Y 6= Z3.
Our following result shows that W indeed satisfies the necessary conditions to charac-
terise rule update operators satisfying the reformulated postulates.
Proposition 23
The assignment W is a well-defined, faithful and organised preorder assignment.
Proof
See Appendix A, page 29.
Furthermore, as a consequence of Theorem 21 and Proposition 23:
Corollary 24
Every rule update operator characterised by W satisfies conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE.
As regards the computational complexity of query answering for rule update operators
characterised by W, it follows the same pattern as query answering for Winslett’s belief
update operator (c.f. Theorems 6 and 7). In the general case, it resides in the second level
of the polynomial hierarchy while for definite programs it drops to the first level. Formally:
1 For the sake of readability, we omit the usual set notation when listing SE-interpretations. For example, instead
of ({ p } , { p, q }) we simply write (p, pq).
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Theorem 25 (Computational complexity of rule updates characterised by W)
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether P ⊕ U |=SE Q for
programs P, U , Q is ΠP2 -complete. Hardness holds even if P is a set of positive facts, U is
a non-disjunctive program and Q contains a single fact from P.
Proof
See Appendix A, page 34.
Theorem 26 (Computational complexity of definite rule updates characterised by W)
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether P ⊕ U |=SE Q for
definite programs P, U , Q is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds even if P is a set of facts
and Q contains a single fact from P.
Proof
See Appendix A, page 35.
4 Support in Semantic Rule Updates
In this section we take a closer look at the behaviour of semantic rule update operators.
One of the benefits of dealing with rule updates on the semantic level is that semantic
properties that are rather difficult to show for syntax-based update operators are much
easier to analyse and prove. For example, one of the most widespread and counterintuitive
side effects of syntactic updates is that they are sensitive to tautological updates. In case
of semantic update operators, such a behaviour is easily shown to be impossible given that
the operator satisfies (P2)SE.
However, semantic update operators do not always behave the way we expect. Consider
first an example using some update operator ⊕ characterised by the order assignment W
defined in the previous section:2
Example 27
Let the programs P, Q and U be as follows:
P : p. Q : p← q. U : ∼q.
q. q.
It can be easily verified that:
JP ⊕ U K
SE
= JQ⊕ U K
SE
= { (p, p) } .
Hence, both P⊕U andQ⊕U have the single answer set J = { p }. In case of P⊕U this is
indeed the expected result. But in case ofQ⊕U we can see that p is true in J even though
there is no rule in Q ∪ U justifying it, i.e. there is no rule with p in its head and its body
2 It has been shown that Winslett’s update semantics has some drawbacks, just as other update operators previ-
ously proposed in the context of Classical Logic do (see (Herzig and Rifi 1999) for a survey). Nevertheless,
we decided to choose Winslett’s update operator as the basis to define a rule update operator and illustrate its
properties because it is one of the most extensively studied and understood update operators, and because the
undesired behaviour illustrated in this example is shared by all update operators based on KM postulates and
SE-models – as we shall see – and not a specific problem due to our choice of Winslett’s operator.
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satisfied in J . This means that the behaviour of ⊕ is in discord with intuitions underlying
most Logic Programming semantics.
In the following we show that such counterintuitive behaviour is not specific to ⊕,
but extends to all semantic update operators for answer-set programs based on the well-
established notions of SE-models and KM postulates. This is especially interesting from
the point of view of comparison with syntax-based approaches to rule updates that, as we
formally pinpoint in what follows, do not suffer from such drawbacks.
The property of support (Apt et al. 1988; Dix 1995b) is one of the basic conditions that
Logic Programming semantics are intuitively designed to satisfy. In the static case, this
property can be formulated as follows:
Definition 28 (Static support)
Let P be a program, p an atom and J an interpretation. We say that P supports p in J if
there is some rule pi ∈ P such that p ∈ H(pi) and J |= B(pi).
A Logic Programming semantics S is supported if for each model J of a program P
under S the following condition is satisfied: Every atom p ∈ J is supported by P in J .
A supported semantics thus requires all atoms in an assigned model to be in the head
of some rule with a satisfied body, ensuring that no atom is true without at least some
justification. Note that the widely accepted Logic Programming semantics, such as the
answer-set and well-founded semantics, are supported (see (Dix 1995a; Dix 1995b) for
more on properties of Logic Programming semantics).
It is only natural to require that rule update operators do not neglect this essential prop-
erty which also gives rise to much of the intuitive appeal of Logic Programming systems.
As it turns out, it is not difficult to verify that despite the substantial differences between
various syntax-based approaches to rule updates and revision, all of the semantics intro-
duced in (Leite and Pereira 1998; Alferes et al. 2000; Eiter et al. 2002; Sakama and Inoue
2003; Alferes et al. 2005; Zhang 2006; Delgrande et al. 2007; Delgrande 2010) respect
support in the following sense:
Definition 29 (Dynamic support)
We say that a rule update operator⊕ respects support if the following condition is satisfied
for all programs P, U and all answer sets J of P ⊕ U : Every atom p ∈ J is supported by
P ∪ U in J .
So an update operator respects support if it returns only programs whose answer sets are
supported by rules from either the original program or from its update. Similarly as in the
case of static support, this amounts to the requirement that an atom may be true only if at
least some justification can be found for it.
Another basic expectation from an update operator is the usual intuition regarding how
facts should be updated by newer facts. It enforces the principle of literal inertia, but only
for the case when both the initial program and its update are consistent sets of facts. Sim-
ilarly as with support, a variety of different syntax-based approaches to rule updates and
revision, in particular the semantics introduced in (Leite and Pereira 1998; Alferes et al.
2000; Eiter et al. 2002; Sakama and Inoue 2003; Alferes et al. 2005; Zhang 2006; Del-
grande et al. 2007; Delgrande 2010), satisfy fact update in the following sense:
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Definition 30 (Fact update)
We say that a rule update operator ⊕ respects fact update if for all consistent sets of facts
P, U , the unique answer set of P ⊕ U is the interpretation
{ p | (p.) ∈ P ∪ U ∧ (∼p.) /∈ U } .
Thus, a rule update operator respects fact update if it is well-behaved w.r.t. consistent
sets of facts: it provides the answer set that contains exactly those atoms that are asserted
as true in either the original program or its update, and are not asserted as false in the
update. This behaviour is widely accepted – it stems from the intuitions regarding database
updates and is uncontroversial in both the belief change and rule change communities.
We conjecture that any reasonable update operator for answer-set programs should sat-
isfy support and fact update since these two properties place basic constraints on its be-
haviour and are based on fundamental and widely accepted intuitions. They are by no
means exhaustive or sufficient – it is not difficult to define rule update operators that satisfy
both of them but are sensitive to tautological updates or quickly end up in an inconsistent
state without a possibility of recovery – but they both seem necessary, even elementary,
properties of a well-behaved rule update operator. However, it turns out that every rule up-
date operator based on SE-models, even if it satisfies only the basic postulate that enforces
syntax independence, fails to comply with at least one of these two basic expectations.
Theorem 31
A rule update operator that satisfies (P4)SE either does not respect support or it does not
respect fact update.
Proof
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator that satisfies (P4)SE and consider again the programs P,
Q and U from Example 27. Since P is strongly equivalent to Q, by (P4)SE we obtain that
P ⊕ U is strongly equivalent to Q⊕ U . Consequently, P ⊕ U has the same answer sets as
Q⊕U . It only remains to observe that if⊕ respects fact update, then P⊕U has the unique
answer set { p }. But then { p } is an answer set of Q ⊕ U in which p is unsupported by
Q∪ U . Hence ⊕ does not respect support.
So any answer-set program update operator based on SE-models and the KM approach
to belief update, as materialised in the fundamental principle (P4)SE, cannot respect two
basic and desirable properties: support and fact update. We believe that this is a major
drawback of such operators, severely diminishing their applicability.
Moreover, the principle (P4)SE is also adopted for revision of answer-set programs based
on SE-models in (Delgrande et al. 2008).3 This means that Theorem 31 extends to semantic
program revision operators, such as those defined in (Delgrande et al. 2008): Whenever
3 Note that the belief update postulate (B4), from which (P4)SE originates, is also one of the reformulated AGM
postulates for belief revision (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992). The original AGM framework (Alchourro´n et al.
1985) assumes that the initial knowledge base B is closed w.r.t. logical consequence and the first AGM pos-
tulate requires that the result of revision also be a closed set. Under these assumptions, different knowledge
bases cannot be equivalent and, as a consequence, the original AGM postulate corresponding to (B4) is ?5: If
Cn(µ) = Cn(ν), then B ? µ = B ? ν (where Cn is the logical consequence operator and ? the revision
operator.)
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support and fact update are expected to be satisfied by a rule revision operator, it cannot be
defined by purely manipulating the sets of SE-models of the underlying programs.
One question that suggests itself is whether a weaker version of the principle (P4)SE can
be combined with properties such as support and fact update. Its two immediate weaken-
ings, analogous to the weakenings of (B4) in (Herzig and Rifi 1999), are as follows:
(P4.1)SE If P ≡SE Q, then P ⊕ U ≡SE Q⊕ U .
(P4.2)SE If U ≡SE V , then P ⊕ U ≡SE P ⊕ V .
In case of (P4.1)SE, it is easy to see that the proof of Theorem 31 applies in the same way
as with (P4)SE, so (P4.1)SE is likewise incompatible with support and fact update.
On the other hand, principle (P4.2)SE, also referred to as Weak Independence of Syntax
(WIS) (Osorio and Cuevas 2007), does not suffer from such severe limitations. It is, nev-
ertheless, violated by syntax-based rule update semantics that assign a special meaning to
occurrences of default literals in heads of rules, as illustrated in the following example:
Example 32
Let the programs P, U and V be as follows:
P : p. U : ∼p← q. V : ∼q ← p.
q.
Since U is strongly equivalent to V , (P4.2)SE requires that P ⊕ U be strongly equivalent to
P⊕V . This is in contrast with the rule update semantics of (Leite and Pereira 1998; Alferes
et al. 2000; Alferes et al. 2005) where a default literal ∼p in the head of a rule indicates
that whenever the body of the rule is satisfied, there is a reason for p to cease being true. A
consequence of this is that an update of P by U results in the single answer set { q } while
an update by V leads to the single answer set { p }.
Thus, when considering the principle (P4.2)SE, benefits of the declarativeness that it brings
with it need to be weighed against the loss of control over the results of updates by rules
with default literals in their heads.
The problems we identified might be mitigated if a richer semantic characterisation of
logic programs was used instead of SE-models. Such a characterisation would have to
be able to distinguish between programs such as P = { p., q. } and Q = { p← q., q. }
because they are expected to behave differently when subject to evolution.
Another alternative is to use one of the syntactic approaches to rule updates, e.g. (Alferes
et al. 2005), that have matured over the years.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we revisited the problem of updates of answer-set programs, in an attempt
to change the focus from the syntactic representation of a program to its semantic content
and to facilitate the analysis of semantic properties of defined update operators. We did
so by applying the established approach to updates following Katsuno and Mendelzon’s
postulates in the context of logic programs. Whereas until recently this was not possi-
ble since these postulates were simply not applicable (nor adaptable) when considering
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non-monotonic Logic Programming semantics, as shown in (Eiter et al. 2002), the intro-
duction of SE-models (Turner 2003), which provide a monotonic characterisation of logic
programs that is strictly more expressive than the answer-set semantics, provided a new
opportunity to cast KM postulates into Logic Programming.
We adapted the KM postulates to be used for answer-set program updates and showed
a representation theorem which provides a constructive characterisation of rule update op-
erators satisfying the postulates. This characterisation not only facilitates the investigation
of these operators’ properties, both semantic as well as computational, but it also provides
an intuitive strategy for constructively defining these operators. This is one of the major
contributions of the paper since it brings, for the first time, updates of answer-set programs
in line with KM postulates. We illustrated this result with a definition of a specific rule
update operator which is a counterpart of Winslett’s belief update operator.
The second important contribution of this paper is the uncovering of a serious drawback
that extends to all answer-set program update operators based on SE-models and AGM-
style approach to program revision and update. All such operators violate at least one
of two basic and very desirable properties. The first one consists of respecting support,
a property that is enjoyed, in the static case, by all widely accepted Logic Programming
semantics. The second property, fact update, is concerned with the answer set assigned to a
consistent set of facts after it is updated by another consistent set of facts. This contribution
is very important as it should guide further research on updates of answer-set programs
a) away from the purely semantic approach materialised in AGM and KM postulates,
or
b) to the development of semantic characterisations of answer-set programs that are
richer than SE-models and appropriately capture their dynamic behaviour, such as
in (Slota and Leite 2012), or even
c) turning back to the more syntactic approaches, such as (Alferes et al. 2005), and see
whether they indeed offer a viable alternative.
Either way, updating answer-set programs is a very important theoretical and practical
problem that is still waiting for a definite solution. Also, despite the issues with the syntax
independence postulate (P4)SE, other principles based on SE-models play an important role
with regards to the classification and evaluation of different approaches to rule change. For
instance, the reformulations of rule change principles from (Eiter et al. 2002) in terms of
strong equivalence, considered already in (Delgrande et al. 2008), can be formulated as
follows:
(Initialisation)SE ∅ ⊕ U ≡SE U .
(Idempotence)SE P ⊕ P ≡SE P.
(Tautology)SE If U ≡SE ∅, then P ⊕ U ≡SE P.
(Absorption)SE If U ≡SE V , then (P ⊕ U)⊕ V ≡SE P ⊕ V .
(Augmentation)SE If V |=SE U , then (P ⊕ U)⊕ V ≡SE P ⊕ V .
We believe that all of these properties are indeed desirable and strengthen their original
formulations in an interesting way. Investigation of operators with these properties, as well
as a further analysis of the postulates (P1)SE – (P8)SE, remains an important research topic.
18 M. Slota and J. Leite
This paper contains, we believe, a relevant contribution to a better understanding of rule
change that will help guide future research.
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Appendix A Proofs: Representation Theorem
Definition 33 (Program corresponding to a set of SE-interpretations)
LetM be a set of SE-interpretations. We denote by ‖M‖ some arbitrary but fixed program
P such that JP KSE = {X,X∗ | X ∈M } .
Instead of ‖ {X1, X2, . . . , Xn } ‖ we usually write ‖X1, X2, . . . , Xn‖.
Definition 34 (Order assignment generated by an update operator)
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator and X an SE-interpretation. We define the binary relation
≺X⊕ for all SE-interpretations Y , Z as follows: Y ≺X⊕ Z if and only if the following
conditions are satisfied:
Y ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE (A1)
Z /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE (A2)
If Y 6= Y ∗, then Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖KSE (A3)
The preorder assignment generated by⊕ assigns to every SE-interpretationX the reflexive
and transitive closure≤X⊕ of≺X⊕ , i.e. Y ≤X⊕ Z if and only if Y = Z or there is some n ≥ 2
and SE-interpretations Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn such that Y = Y1 ≺X⊕ Y2 ≺X⊕ · · · ≺X⊕ Yn = Z.
Lemma 35
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator satisfying conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE and X , Y , Z some
SE-interpretations. If Y ≤X⊕ Z, then either Y = Z or Z /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
Proof
Suppose that Y 6= Z. Then, by the definition of≤X⊕ , for some n ≤ 2 and SE-interpretations
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn it holds that Y = Y1 ≺X⊕ Y2 ≺X⊕ · · · ≺X⊕ Yn = Z. We will prove by
induction on n that Yn /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn‖KSE from which the desired result follows
directly.
1◦ For n = 2 this follows from Y1 ≺X⊕ Y2 by (A2).
2◦ We inductively assume that
Yn /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn‖KSE (A4)
and prove that Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn+1‖KSE.
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We know that Yn ≺X⊕ Yn+1, so by (A2) we obtain
Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Yn, Yn+1‖KSE . (A5)
Considering that the program ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖∧˙‖Y1, Yn‖ is strongly equivalent to ‖Y1, Yn‖,
by (P5)SE and (P4)SE we conclude that
(‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖) ∧˙ ‖Y1, Yn‖ |=SE ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn‖
which, together with (A4), implies that
Yn /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖KSE . (A6)
Similarly, since the program ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ ∧˙ ‖Yn, Yn+1‖ is strongly equivalent to
‖Yn, Yn+1‖, by (P5)SE and (P4)SE we obtain that
(‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖) ∧˙ ‖Yn, Yn+1‖ |=SE ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Yn, Yn+1‖ ,
and so due to (A5) it holds that
Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖KSE . (A7)
Now we consider two cases:
a) If Yn = Y ∗n , then (A6) and (P1)SE imply that
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ |=SE ‖Y1, Yn+1‖ ;
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn+1‖ |=SE ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ ,
so by (P6)SE we can conclude that ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ is strongly equivalent
to ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn+1‖. But then the desired conclusion follows from (A7).
b) If Yn 6= Y ∗n , then from (A3) we infer that
Yn+1 ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗n , Yn+1‖KSE . (A8)
Furthermore, from (A6) and (P1)SE we obtain
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ |=SE ‖Y1, Y ∗n , Yn+1‖ ;
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Y ∗n , Yn+1‖ |=SE ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ ,
so by (P6)SE we can conclude that ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn, Yn+1‖ is strongly equivalent
to ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Y ∗n , Yn+1‖ and, due to (A7),
Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Y ∗n , Yn+1‖KSE .
Since ‖Y1, Y ∗n , Yn+1‖ is strongly equivalent to ‖Y1, Yn+1‖ ∨˙ ‖Y ∗n , Yn+1‖, it
follows from (P4)SE and (P7)SE that either Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y1, Yn+1‖KSE or
Yn+1 /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗n , Yn+1‖KSE. The latter is impossible due to (A8).
Lemma 36
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator satisfying conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE and X , Y , Z, some
SE-interpretations. If Y ≮X⊕ Z, then the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) If Y = Z∗, then Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y, Z‖KSE.
(2) If Y = Y ∗ and Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Z‖KSE, then Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
(3) If Y 6= Y ∗ and Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖KSE, then Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
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Proof
First we show the following auxiliary statement: If Y = Z or Y /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE,
then all three conditions are satisfied.
First suppose that Y = Z. If Y = Z∗, then Y = Y ∗ = Z = Z∗, so it follows from
(P1)SE and (P3)SE that J‖X‖⊕‖Y,Z‖KSE = J‖X‖⊕‖Z∗‖KSE = {Z∗ }, verifying condition
(1). Furthermore, conditions (2) and (3) are satisfied because ‖Z‖ = ‖Y ∗, Z‖ = ‖Y,Z‖.
Now suppose that Y /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE. If Y = Z∗, then it follows from (P1)SE and
(P3)SE that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y, Z‖KSE. If Y = Y ∗, then it follows from (P1)SE that
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖ |=SE ‖Z‖ and ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Z‖ |=SE ‖Y, Z‖ ,
so by (P6)SE we obtain that ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖ ≡SE ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Z‖. Hence, it follows from Z ∈J‖X‖⊕‖Z‖KSE that Z ∈ J‖X‖⊕‖Y,Z‖KSE. On the other hand, if Y 6= Y ∗, then it follows
from (P1)SE that
‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y, Z‖ |=SE ‖Y ∗, Z‖ and ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖ |=SE ‖Y, Z‖ ,
so by (P6)SE we obtain that ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖ ≡SE ‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖. Hence it follows from
Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖KSE that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
Turning to the proof of the lemma, note that since Y ≮X⊕ Z, either Y X⊕ Z orZ ≤X⊕ Y .
In the former case, Y ⊀X⊕ Z, so, by the definition of ≺X⊕ , either Y /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y, Z‖KSE,
so we can apply our auxiliary statement, or Z ∈ J‖X‖⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE as desired, or Y 6= Y ∗
and Z /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖KSE, in which case all three conditions are trivially satisfied. In
the latter case it follows from Lemma 35 that either Y = Z or Y /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE, so
the rest follows once again from the auxiliary statement.
Proposition 37
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator satisfying conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE, X an SE-interpreta-
tion and U a program. Then,
J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE = min (JU KSE,≤X⊕) .
Proof
First take some Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE. By (P1)SE, Z ∈ JU KSE. Suppose that Z is not minimal
in JU KSE w.r.t. ≤X⊕ . Then there is some Y ∈ JU KSE such that Y <X⊕ Z. Thus, Y 6=
Z, and by Lemma 35 we conclude that Z /∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE. Considering that U ∧˙
‖Y,Z‖ is strongly equivalent to ‖Y,Z‖, it follows from (P4)SE and (P5)SE that (‖X‖⊕U) ∧˙
‖Y,Z‖ |=SE ‖X‖⊕‖Y, Z‖. Consequently, Z /∈ J‖X‖⊕U KSE, contrary to our assumption.
Therefore, J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE is a subset of min(JU KSE,≤X⊕ ).
To prove the converse inclusion, assume that Z is minimal in JU KSE w.r.t. ≤X⊕ and take
some Y ∈ JU KSE. Note that Y ≮X⊕ Z, so we can use Lemma 36. We will show that
Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE. We consider three cases:
a) If Y = Z∗, then Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE follows immediately from condition (1) of
Lemma 36.
b) If Y = Y ∗, then the previous case together with the fact that JU KSE is well-defined
entails that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Z‖KSE and by condition (2) of Lemma 36 it follows that
Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
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c) If Y 6= Y ∗, then the previous case together with the fact that JU KSE is well-defined
entails that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, Z‖KSE and by condition (3) of Lemma 36 it follows that
Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,Z‖KSE.
The choice of Y was arbitrary, so we have proven that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y, Z‖KSE for all
Y ∈ JU KSE. This means that by repeated application of (P7)SE, Z is an SE-model of the
program
‖X‖ ⊕
∨˙
Y ∈JU KSE
‖Y,Z‖
and since U is strongly equivalent to the program ∨˙Y ∈JU KSE ‖Y, Z‖, it follows from (P4)SE
that Z ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE.
Proposition 38
If a rule update operator⊕ satisfies conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE, then the preorder assignment
generated by ⊕ is semi-faithful and organised and it characterises ⊕.
Proof
First we show that the assignment generated by ⊕ characterises ⊕. We know that P is
strongly equivalent to the program
∨˙
X∈JP KSE ‖X‖, so by (P4)SE and repeated application
of (P8)SE we obtain that P ⊕ U is strongly equivalent to the program∨˙
X∈JP KSE
(‖X‖ ⊕ U) .
Furthermore, Proposition 37 implies that J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE = min (JU KSE,≤X⊕), so indeed
JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
J‖X‖ ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤X⊕) . (A9)
To see that the assignment generated by ⊕ is semi-faithful, first take some SE-interpre-
tations X , Y such that Y 6= X and Y 6= X∗. We need to show that either X <X⊕ Y or
X∗ <X⊕ Y . The equation (A9) together with (P2)SE imply that
J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y ∗, X‖KSE = min ({Y ∗, X,X∗ } ,≤X⊕) ∪min({Y ∗, X,X∗ } ,≤X∗⊕ )
= {X,X∗ } ,
J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖Y,X‖KSE = min ({Y, Y ∗, X,X∗ } ,≤X⊕) ∪min({Y, Y ∗, X,X∗ } ,≤X∗⊕ )
= {X,X∗ } .
Thus, Y ∗ is not minimal within {Y ∗, X,X∗ } and Y is not minimal within {Y, Y ∗, X,X∗ }
w.r.t. ≤X⊕ . In other words:
either X <X⊕ Y
∗ or X∗ <X⊕ Y
∗ and (A10)
either X <X⊕ Y or X
∗ <X⊕ Y or Y
∗ <X⊕ Y . (A11)
In case of the first two alternatives of (A11), we have already achieved our goal. The third
alternative together with (A10) and transitivity of <X⊕ also concludes the proof of the first
condition of semi-faithfulness. To see that the second condition holds as well, consider that
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by (P2)SE, J‖X∗‖ ⊕ ‖X‖KSE = {X∗ } and J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖X‖KSE = {X,X∗ }, so it follows
from (A9) that
X /∈ min({X,X∗ } ,≤X∗⊕ ) and X ∈ min({X,X∗ } ,≤X⊕ ) ∪min({X,X∗ } ,≤X
∗
⊕ ) .
Hence, X ∈ min({X,X∗ } ,≤X⊕ ). In other words, if X∗ ≤X⊕ X , then it must also be the
case that X ≤X⊕ X∗. Consequently, the order assignment generated by ⊕ is semi-faithful.
To show that it is also organised, consider well-defined sets of SE-interpretations M,
N , and SE-interpretations X , Y such that
Y ∈ min (M,≤X⊕) ∪min(M,≤X∗⊕ ) and Y ∈ min (N ,≤X⊕) ∪min(N ,≤X∗⊕ ) .
By (A9) we obtain that Y ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖M‖KSE and Y ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖N‖KSE. Applying
(P7)SE and (P4)SE yields that Y ∈ J‖X‖ ⊕ ‖M ∪ N‖KSE. Consequently, by (A9), either
Y ∈ min (M∪N ,≤X⊕) or Y ∈ min (M∪N ,≤X∗⊕ ), so the order assignment generated
by ⊕ is organised.
Lemma 39
Let ω be a semi-faithful preorder assignment and X an SE-interpretation. Then there is no
SE-interpretation Y such that Y <Xω X .
Proof
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that Y <Xω X for some SE-interpretation Y . Clearly,
Y 6= X due to irreflexivity of <Xω and Y 6= X∗ due to the second condition of semi-
faithfulness. Hence, Y 6= X and Y 6= X∗, so by the first condition of semi-faithfulness,
either X <Xω Y or X
∗ <Xω Y . The former is in conflict with the irreflexivity of <
X
ω and
in the latter case it follows by transitivity of <Xω that X
∗ <Xω X , contrary to the second
condition of semi-faithfulness.
Proposition 40
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator. If ⊕ is characterised by a semi-faithful and organised
preorder assignment, then it is also characterised by a faithful and organised partial order
assignment.
Proof
Let ⊕ be characterised by a semi-faithful and organised preorder assignment ω. We define
the assignment ω′ over X as follows:
Y ≤Xω′ Z if and only if Y = X ∨ Y = Z ∨ Y <Xω Z .
We need to show that ≤Xω′ is a partial order for all X ∈ X, that ω′ is faithful and
organised and that for all programs P, U ,
JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω′) .
Note that due to Lemma 39, the following holds for all SE-interpretations X , Y :
If Y ≤Xω′ X , then Y = X. (A12)
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Otherwise we would obtain that Y <Xω X which is in conflict with Lemma 39.
Turning back to the main proof, reflexivity of ≤Xω′ follows directly by its definition.
To show that≤Xω′ is antisymmetric, take some SE-interpretations Y1, Y2 such that Y1 ≤Xω′
Y2 and Y2 ≤Xω′ Y1. If Y1 = X , then Y2 ≤Xω′ X and it follows from (A12) that Y2 = X =
Y1. The case when Y2 = X is symmetric. If Y1 6= X and Y2 6= X , then, by the definition
of ≤Xω′ , either Y1 = Y2 as desired, or Y1 <Xω Y2 and Y2 <Xω Y1, which is in conflict with
the transitivity and irreflexivity of <Xω .
Turning to transitivity of ≤Xω′ , suppose that Y1 ≤Xω′ Y2 and Y2 ≤Xω′ Y3. We need to show
that Y1 ≤Xω′ Y3. We consider three cases:
a) If Y1 = X , then Y1 ≤Xω′ Y3 by the definition of ≤Xω′ .
b) If Y2 = X , then Y1 ≤Xω′ X , so Y1 = X due to (A12) and the previous case applies.
c) If Y1 6= X and Y2 6= X , then the desired conclusion follows from the transitivity of
equality and of <Xω .
As for faithfulness of ω′, suppose that Y 6= X . We have X ≤Xω′ Y by definition and
Y Xω′ X follows from (A12).
To show that ω′ is organised, we prove the following property: For any well-defined set
of SE-interpretationsM and any SE-interpretation X ,
min
(M,≤Xω′) ∪min(M,≤X∗ω′ ) = min (M,≤Xω ) ∪min(M,≤X∗ω ) . (A13)
From (A13) it follows that since ω is organised, ω′ must also be.
Before we prove (A13), we need to note that Y <Xω′ Z holds if and only if Y ≤Xω′ Z and
Z Xω′ Y , so according to the definition of ≤Xω′ ,
Y <Xω′ Z if and only if (Y = X∨Y = Z∨Y <Xω Z)∧(Z 6= X∧Z 6= Y ∧Z 6<Xω Y ) .
Due to Lemma 39 and the transitivity and irreflexivity of <Xω , this can be simplified to
Y <Xω′ Z if and only if (Y = X ∧ Y 6= Z) ∨ Y <Xω Z . (A14)
Coming back to the proof of (A13), we need to consider three cases:
a) If X /∈M and X∗ /∈M, then for all Y,Z ∈M, Y 6= X and Y 6= X∗, so by (A14),
Y <Xω′ Z if and only if Y <
X
ω Z and Y <
X∗
ω′ Z if and only if Y <
X∗
ω Z ,
from which the desired conclusion follows directly.
b) If X /∈M and X∗ ∈M, then for all Y,Z ∈M, Y 6= X , so by (A14),
Y <Xω′ Z if and only if Y <
X
ω Z .
Consequently, min(M,≤Xω′) = min(M,≤Xω ), and by (A14) and semi-faithfulness of
ω we obtain min(M,≤X∗ω′ ) = {X∗ } = min(M,≤X
∗
ω ).
c) If X ∈M, then X∗ ∈M, and by (A14) and semi-faithfulness of ω,
{X } ⊆ min (M,≤Xω ) ⊆ {X,X∗ } , min(M,≤X∗ω ) = {X∗ } ,
min
(M,≤Xω′) = {X } , min(M,≤X∗ω′ ) = {X∗ } ,
from which the desired conclusion follows straightforwardly.
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Finally, it follows from the assumption that ω characterises ⊕ and from (A13) that
JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω )
=
⋃
X∈JP KSE
(
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) ∪min(JU KSE,≤X∗ω ))
=
⋃
X∈JP KSE
(
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω′) ∪min(JU KSE,≤X∗ω′ ))
=
⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω′) .
Proposition 41
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator. If ⊕ is characterised by a faithful and organised partial
order assignment, then ⊕ satisfies conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE.
Proof
Let⊕ be characterised by a faithful and organised partial order assignment ω. We consider
each condition separately:
(P1)SE Since ω characterises ⊕, for all programs P, U ,JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) ,
so all elements of JP ⊕ U KSE belong to JU KSE. Equivalently, P ⊕ U |=SE U .
(P2)SE Suppose that P |=SE U and take some X ∈ JP KSE ⊆ JU KSE. Since the preorder
assignment is faithful, for all Y ∈ JU KSE with Y 6= X we have X <Xω Y . Conse-
quently, min(JU KSE,≤Xω ) = {X } and soJP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
{X } = JP KSE .
(P3)SE Suppose that both JP KSE 6= ∅ and JU KSE 6= ∅. Then there is some X0 ∈ JP KSE and
also some Y ∈ min(JU KSE,≤X0ω ), so we obtain
Y ∈ min (JU KSE,≤X0ω ) ⊆ ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) = JP ⊕ U KSE .
Hence, JP ⊕ U KSE 6= ∅.
(P4)SE If P ≡SE Q and U ≡SE V , thenJP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) = ⋃
X∈JQKSE
min
(JV KSE,≤Xω )
= JQ⊕ V KSE .
Therefore, P ⊕ U ≡SE Q⊕ V .
(P5)SE Suppose that Y is an SE-model of (P⊕U) ∧˙ V . Then Y ∈ JV KSE and there is some
SE-model X of P such that Y belongs to min(JU KSE,≤Xω ). Consequently, Y also
belongs to min(JU KSE ∩ JV KSE,≤Xω ), so Y is an SE-model of P ⊕ (U ∧˙ V).
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(P6)SE Assume that P ⊕ U |=SE V and P ⊕ V |=SE U . We will prove by contradiction that
P ⊕ U |=SE P ⊕ V . The other half can be proved similarly.
So suppose that Y is an SE-model of P ⊕ U but not of P ⊕ V . Then there is some
SE-model X of P such that
Y ∈ min(JU KSE,≤Xω ) . (A15)
At the same time, there must be some SE-model Z of V such that Z <Xω Y . Let
Z0 be minimal w.r.t. ≤Xω among all such Z. Then by transitivity of <Xω we obtain
that Z0 ∈ min(JV KSE,≤Xω ) and, consequently, Z0 is an SE-model of P⊕V . By the
assumption we now obtain that Z0 is an SE-model of U . But since Z0 <Xω Y , this
is in conflict with (A15).
(P7)SE Suppose that P is strongly equivalent to ‖X‖ for some SE-interpretation X and Y
is an SE-model of both P ⊕ U and P ⊕ V . We will show that Y is an SE-model of
P ⊕ (U ∨˙ V). LetM = JU KSE and N = JV KSE. It follows that
Y ∈ min(M,≤Xω ) ∪min(M,≤X
∗
ω ) and Y ∈ min(N ,≤Xω ) ∪min(N ,≤X
∗
ω ) ,
so since ω is organised, Y ∈ min(M∪ N ,≤Xω ) ∪ min(M∪ N ,≤X
∗
ω ). Conse-
quently, Y is an SE-model of P ⊕ (U ∨˙ V).
(P8)SE The following sequence of equations establishes the property:J(P ∨˙ Q)⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP∨˙QKSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω )
=
⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω ) ∪ ⋃
X∈JQKSE
min
(JU KSE,≤Xω )
= JP ⊕ U KSE ∪ JQ⊕ U KSE
= J(P ⊕ U) ∨˙ (Q⊕ U)KSE
Theorem 21.
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator. The following conditions are equivalent:
a) The operator ⊕ satisfies conditions (P1)SE – (P8)SE.
b) The operator ⊕ is characterised by a semi-faithful and organised preorder assignment.
c) The operator ⊕ is characterised by a faithful and organised partial order assignment.
Proof of Theorem 21
Follows from Propositions 38, 40 and 41.
Appendix B Proofs: Properties of the AssignmentW
Proposition 42
The assignment W is a preorder assignment.
Proof
Recall that the assignment W is defined for all SE-interpretations X = (I, J), Y =
(K1, L1), Z = (K2, L2) as follows: Y ≤XW Z if and only if
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1. (L1 ÷ J) ⊆ (L2 ÷ J);
2. If (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J), then (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
In order to show that W is a preorder assignment, we need to prove that given an arbitrary
SE-interpretation X = (I, J), ≤XW is a preorder over X. This holds if and only if ≤XW
is reflexive and transitive. First we show reflexivity. Take some SE-interpretation Y =
(K,L). By definition, Y ≤XW Y holds if and only if
1. (L÷ J) ⊆ (L÷ J);
2. If (L÷ J) = (L÷ J), then (K ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L÷ J .
It is not difficult to check that both conditions hold.
To show transitivity, take some SE-interpretations Y1 = (K1, L1), Y2 = (K2, L2), Y3 =
(K3, L3) such that Y1 ≤XW Y2 and Y2 ≤XW Y3. We need to show that Y1 ≤XW Y3. According
to the definition of ≤XW we obtain
1. (L1 ÷ J) ⊆ (L2 ÷ J);
2. If (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J), then (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J ;
and also
1’ (L2 ÷ J) ⊆ (L3 ÷ J);
2’ If (L2 ÷ J) = (L3 ÷ J), then (K2 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K3 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L2 ÷ J .
We need to show the following two conditions:
1∗ (L1 ÷ J) ⊆ (L3 ÷ J);
2∗ If (L1 ÷ J) = (L3 ÷ J), then (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K3 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
It can be seen that 1∗ follows from 1. and 1’ by transitivity of the subset relation. To show
that 2∗ holds as well, suppose that (L1 ÷ J) = (L3 ÷ J). Then by 1. and 1’ we obtain that
(L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J) = (L3 ÷ J) = ∆ and so by 2. and 2’ it holds that
(K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K2 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K3 ÷ I) \∆ .
Consequently, 2∗ is also satisfied and the proof is finished.
Lemma 43
Let X = (I, J), Y = (K1, L1), Z = (K2, L2) be SE-interpretations. Then Y <XW Z
holds if and only if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
a) (L1 ÷ J) ( (L2 ÷ J), or
b) (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J) and (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ( (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
Proof
By definition, Y <XW Z holds if and only if Y ≤XW Z and it is not the case that Z ≤XW Y .
This in turn holds if and only if the following two conditions hold
1. (L1 ÷ J) ⊆ (L2 ÷ J);
2. If (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J), then (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ⊆ (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
and one of the following conditions also holds:
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i) (L2 ÷ J) * (L1 ÷ J), or
ii) (L2 ÷ J) = (L1 ÷ J) and (K2 ÷ I) \∆ * (K1 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L2 ÷ J .
It is not difficult to verify that conditions 1., 2. and i) are together equivalent to a) and that
conditions 1., 2. and ii) are together equivalent to b). This concludes our proof.
Proposition 44
The assignment W is well-defined.
Proof
By definition we need to show that there is a rule update operator ⊕ such that for all
programs P, U , JP ⊕ U KSE = ⋃
X∈JP KSE
min
(JU KSE,≤XW ) .
This holds if and only if for every well-defined set of SE-interpretations M and every
SE-interpretation X , the set of SE-interpretations
min
(M,≤XW ) ∪min(M,≤X∗W ) (B1)
is well-defined. Suppose that Y belongs to (B1). We need to demonstrate that Y ∗ also
belongs to (B1). We consider two cases:
(a) Suppose that Y ∈ min(M,≤XW ). If Y ∗ belongs to min(M,≤X
∗
W ), then we are fin-
ished. On the other hand, if Y ∗ does not belong to min(M,≤X∗W ), then there must
be some Z ∈ M such that Z <X∗W Y ∗. Let Y = (K1, L1), Z = (K2, L2) and
X = (I, J). By Lemma 43 we know that Z <X
∗
W Y
∗ holds if and only if one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
a) (L2 ÷ J) ( (L1 ÷ J), or
b) (L2 ÷ J) = (L1 ÷ J) and (K2 ÷ J) \∆ ( (L1 ÷ J) \∆ where ∆ = L2 ÷ J .
If a) is satisfied, then Lemma 43 implies that Z <XW Y which is in conflict with the
assumption that Y ∈ min(M,≤XW ). So b) must hold. But in that case we infer that
(K2 ÷ J) \∆ is a proper subset of
(L1 ÷ J) \∆ = (L1 ÷ J) \ (L1 ÷ J) = ∅ ,
which is impossible.
(b) Suppose that Y ∈ min(M,≤X∗W ) and let X = (I, J), Y = (K,L). First we show that
Y ∗ ≤X∗W Y holds – for this, the following conditions need to be satisfied:
1. (L÷ J) ⊆ (L÷ J);
2. If (L÷ J) = (L÷ J), then (L÷ J) \∆ ⊆ (K ÷ J) \∆ where ∆ = L÷ J .
It is not difficult to verify that both conditions hold.
Thus, since Y ∗ ≤X∗W Y , there can be no Z ∈ M with Z <X
∗
W Y
∗ because by transi-
tivity we would obtain Z <X
∗
W Y which would be in conflict with the assumption that
Y ∈ min(M,≤X∗W ). So Y ∗ ∈ min(M,≤X
∗
W ) and our proof is finished.
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Proposition 45
The assignment W is faithful.
Proof
Take some SE-interpretations X = (I, J), Y = (K,L) such that Y 6= X . We need to
show thatX <XW Y . By Lemma 43 this holds if and only if one of the following conditions
is satisfied:
a) (J ÷ J) ( (L÷ J), or
b) (J ÷ J) = (L÷ J) and (I ÷ I) \∆ ( (K ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = J ÷ J .
We consider two cases:
i) If L÷ J = ∅, then L = J and since Y 6= X , we conclude that K 6= I . Consequently,
the second condition is satisfied because I ÷ I = J ÷J = ∅ and K ÷ I is non-empty.
ii) If L÷ J 6= ∅, then a) holds since J ÷ J = ∅.
Proposition 46
The assignment W is organised.
Proof
Recall that by definition W is organised if for all SE-interpretations X , Y and all well-
defined sets of SE-interpretationsM,N the following condition is satisfied:
If Y ∈ min(M,≤XW ) ∪min(M,≤X
∗
W ) and Y ∈ min(N ,≤XW ) ∪min(N ,≤X
∗
W ),
then Y ∈ min(M∪N ,≤XW ) ∪min(M∪N ,≤X
∗
W ).
Suppose that Y /∈ min(M∪N ,≤XW )∪min(M∪N ,≤X
∗
W ). We need to show that at least
one of the following holds:
i) Y /∈ min(M,≤XW ) ∪min(M,≤X
∗
W );
ii) Y /∈ min(N ,≤XW ) ∪min(N ,≤X
∗
W ).
If Y /∈M, then i) is trivially satisfied. Similarly, if Y /∈ N , then ii) is trivially satisfied.
So we can assume that Y ∈M∩N . It follows from the assumption that there must be some
Z1, Z2 ∈ M ∪ N such that Z1 <XW Y and Z2 <X
∗
W Y . If Z1 and Z2 both belong toM,
then i) is satisfied; if they both belong to N , then ii) is satisfied. So let’s assume, without
loss of generality, that Z1 ∈ M and Z2 ∈ N . Furthermore, let X = (I, J), Y = (K,L),
Z1 = (K1, L1) and Z2 = (K2, L2). It follows from Z2 <X
∗
W Y and Lemma 43 that we
need to consider two cases:
a) If (L2 ÷ J) ( (L÷ J), then by Lemma 43 we also have Z2 <XW Y and, consequently,
ii) is satisfied.
b) If (L2 ÷ J) = (L÷ J) and (K2 ÷ J) \∆ ( (K ÷ J) \∆ where ∆ = L2 ÷ J , then it
follows that (K ÷ J) \∆ 6= ∅ and by using ∆ = L2 ÷ J = L÷ J we obtain
(K ÷ J) \ (L÷ J) 6= ∅ . (B2)
Furthermore, from Z1 <XW Y we know that one of the following cases occurs:
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a’) (L1 ÷ J) ( (L÷ J), or
b’) (L1 ÷ J) = (L÷ J) and (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ( (K ÷ I) \∆, where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
We will show that Z∗1 <
X∗
W Y . By Lemma 43 this holds if and only if one of the
following conditions is satisfied:
a∗) (L1 ÷ J) ( (L÷ J), or
b∗) (L1 ÷ J) = (L÷ J) and (L1 ÷ J) \∆ ( (K ÷ J) \∆, where ∆ = L1 ÷ J .
We see that a’) implies a∗) and b’) together with (B2) implies b∗). Also, since M is
well-defined, we have Z∗1 ∈M, so i) is satisfied.
Proposition 23.
The assignment W is a well-defined, faithful and organised preorder assignment.
Proof of Proposition 23
Follows by Propositions 42, 44, 45 and 46.
Appendix C Proofs: Computational Complexity of Operators Characterised byW
Definition 47 (Truth value assigned by SE-interpretation)
Let X be an SE-interpretation and p an atom. We define the truth value assigned by X to
p as follows:
X(p) =

T if p ∈ I ;
U if p ∈ J \ I ;
F if p ∈ A \ J .
Definition 48 (Set of relevant atoms)
Let φ be a propositional formula. We inductively define the set of atoms relevant to φ,
denoted by at(φ), as follows:
• If φ is > or ⊥, then at(φ) = ∅;
• If φ is an atom p, then at(φ) = { p };
• If φ is of the form ¬ψ, then at(φ) = at(ψ);
• If φ is of the form ψ1∧ψ2, ψ1∨ψ2, ψ1 ⊃ ψ2 or ψ1 ≡ ψ2, then at(φ) = at(ψ1)∪at(ψ2).
For a logic program P, at(P) = at(κ(P)).
Lemma 49
Let P, U be programs and ⊕ a rule update operator characterised by W. If Z belongs to
min(JU KSE,≤XW ) for some X ∈ JP KSE, then X(p) = Z(p) for all p ∈ A \ at(U).
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Proof
We prove by contradiction. Suppose that our assumptions are satisfied and X(p) 6= Z(p)
for some p ∈ A \ at(U). Let the SE-interpretation Y be defined as follows:
Y (q) =
{
X(q) q = p ;
Z(q) q 6= p .
First note that since Z is an SE-model of U and Y differs from Z only in the truth value
assigned to p, where p /∈ at(U), it follows that Y is also an SE-model of U .
Put X = (I, J), Y = (K1, L1) and Z = (K2, L2). By assumption, X(p) 6= Z(p), so,
by the definition of Y , Y (p) 6= Z(p). Thus, one of the following cases occurs:
a) If L1 ÷ L2 = { p }, then we immediately obtain that (L1 ÷ J) ÷ (L2 ÷ J) = { p }.
Since Y (p) = X(p), we conclude that p /∈ L1 ÷ J and it follows that
(L1 ÷ J) \ (L2 ÷ J) = ∅ and (L2 ÷ J) \ (L1 ÷ J) = { p } .
Consequently, L1 ÷ J ( L2 ÷ J , so Y <XW Z, contrary to the assumption that Z
belongs to min(JU KSE,≤XW ).
b) If K1 ÷K2 = { p }, then we obtain that (K1 ÷ I)÷ (K2 ÷ I) = { p }. Since Y (p) =
X(p), we conclude that p /∈ K1 ÷ I and it follows that
(K1 ÷ I) \ (K2 ÷ I) = ∅ and (K2 ÷ I) \ (K1 ÷ I) = { p } .
Furthermore, assuming that the previous case does not occur, it follows that L1 = L2,
so for ∆ = L1÷J = L2÷J it holds that p /∈ ∆ because X(p) = Z(p). Consequently,
(K1 ÷ I) \∆ ( (K2 ÷ I) \∆, so Y <XW Z, contrary to the assumption that Z belongs
to min(JU KSE,≤XW ).
Definition 50 (Truth value substitution)
Let X = (I, J) be an SE-interpretation and p an atom. We define the SE-interpretations
X [p:=T], X [p:=U] and X [p:=F] as follows:
X [p:=T] = (I ∪ { p } , J ∪ { p }) ,
X [p:=U] = (I \ { p } , J ∪ { p }) ,
X [p:=F] = (I \ { p } , J \ { p }) .
Lemma 51
Let X , Y , Z be SE-interpretations, p an atom such that X(p) = Z(p) and V a truth value.
Then,
Y <XW Z implies Y
[p:=V] <X
[p:=V]
W Z
[p:=V] .
Proof
Put X = (I, J), Y = (K1, L1) and Z = (K2, L2). The assumption that X(p) = Z(p)
implies that
p /∈ L2 ÷ J and p /∈ K2 ÷ I . (C1)
Furthermore, if Y <XW Z, then, by Lemma 43, one of the following two cases occurs:
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a) If (L1 ÷ J) ( (L2 ÷ J), then it follows from (C1) that p /∈ L1 ÷ J and we obtain the
following:
(L1 ∪ { p })÷ (J ∪ { p }) = L1 ÷ J ( L2 ÷ J = (L2 ∪ { p })÷ (J ∪ { p }) , (C2)
(L1 \ { p })÷ (J \ { p }) = L1 ÷ J ( L2 ÷ J = (L2 \ { p })÷ (J \ { p }) . (C3)
Finally, we need to consider two cases depending on V:
(i) If V = T or V = U, then the second components of the SE-interpretations
X [p:=V], Y [p:=V] and Z [p:=V] are J ∪{ p }, L1∪{ p } and L2∪{ p }, respectively.
Hence, the desired conclusion follows from (C2) by Lemma 43.
(ii) If V = F, then the second components of the SE-interpretations X [p:=V], Y [p:=V]
and Z [p:=V] are J \{ p }, L1 \{ p } and L2 \{ p }, respectively. Hence, the desired
conclusion follows from (C3) by Lemma 43.
b) If (L1 ÷ J) = (L2 ÷ J) and (K1 ÷ I) \∆ ( (K2 ÷ I) \∆ where ∆ = L1 ÷ J , then
L1 = L2 and it follows from (C1) that p /∈ ∆ as well as p /∈ K1 ÷ I , so we obtain the
following:
(L1 ∪ { p })÷ (J ∪ { p }) = (L2 ∪ { p })÷ (J ∪ { p }) = ∆ , (C4)
(L1 \ { p })÷ (J \ { p }) = (L2 \ { p })÷ (J \ { p }) = ∆ , (C5)
[(K1 ∪ { p })÷ (I ∪ { p })] \∆ = (K1 ÷ I) \∆
( (K2 ÷ I) \∆ = [(K2 ∪ { p })÷ (I ∪ { p })] \∆ ,
(C6)
[(K1 \ { p })÷ (I \ { p })] \∆ = (K1 ÷ I) \∆
( (K2 ÷ I) \∆ = [(K2 \ { p })÷ (I \ { p })] \∆ .
(C7)
Finally, we need to use Lemma 43, considering three cases depending on V:
(i) If V = T, then the desired conclusion follows from (C4) and (C6).
(ii) If V = U, then the desired conclusion follows from (C4) and (C7).
(iii) If V = F, then the desired conclusion follows from (C5) and (C7).
Lemma 52
Let P, U be programs, p an atom with p /∈ at(P) ∪ at(U), ⊕ a rule update operator
characterised by W and Z, Z ′ be SE-interpretations such that Z = Z ′[p:=V] for some truth
value V. Then,
Z ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE if and only if Z ′ ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE .
Proof
We prove the direct implication, the converse one follows by the symmetry of the claim.
Suppose that Z ∈ JP⊕U KSE but Z ′ /∈ JP⊕U KSE. Then there is some SE-interpretation
X ∈ JP KSE such that Z belongs to min(JU KSE,≤XW ). It follows from Lemma 49 that
X(p) = Z(p) = V .
Put Z ′(p) = V′ and let X ′ = X [p:=V
′]. Since X ′ differs from X only in the truth value
32 M. Slota and J. Leite
assigned to p and p /∈ at(P), it follows that X ′ ∈ JP KSE. Thus, there exists some SE-inter-
pretation Y ′ such that Y ′ <X
′
W Z
′ and by Lemma 51 we conclude that
Y ′[p:=V] <X
′[p:=V]
W Z
′[p:=V] .
It remains to observe that X ′[p:=V] = X and Z ′[p:=V] = Z, so for Y = Y ′[p:=V] we have
Y <XW Z .
Since Y differs from Y ′ only in the truth value assigned to p and p /∈ at(U), it follows that
Y ∈ JU KSE – a conflict with the assumption that Z belongs to min(JU KSE,≤XW ).
Corollary 53
Let P, U be programs, ⊕ a rule update operator characterised by W and Z, Z ′ be SE-inter-
pretations such that Z(p) = Z ′(p) for all p ∈ at(P) ∪ at(U). Then,
Z ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE if and only if Z ′ ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE .
Proof
Suppose that
A \ (at(P) ∪ at(U)) = { p1, p2, . . . , pn }
and construct a sequence of SE-interpretations Z0, Z1, . . . , Zn as follows: Z0 = Z and
Zi+1 = Z
[pi:=Z
′(pi)]
i for all i with 0 ≤ i < n. Clearly, Zn = Z ′ and Lemma 52 can be
used n times, for each pair (Zi, Zi+1), to infer the desired result.
Lemma 54
Let P be a set of facts, U a program such that at(U) ⊆ at(P), ⊕ a rule update operator
characterised by W and Z an SE-interpretation from JP ⊕ U KSE. Then for every atom p
with (p.) ∈ P it holds that Z(p) 6= U.
Proof
Suppose that Z belongs to JP ⊕ U KSE, put Z = (K,L) and let
Y = (K ∩ at(P), L ∩ at(P)) .
It follows by Corollary 53 that Y belongs to JP ⊕ U KSE. Thus, there exists some SE-inter-
pretation X ∈ JP KSE such that Y belongs to min(JU KSE,≤XW ). Also, using Lemma 49 we
conclude that X assigns truth values as follows:
X(q) =

T (q.) ∈ P ;
F (∼q.) ∈ P ;
F q ∈ A \ at(P) .
In other words, X is of the form (J, J) where J = { q ∈ A | (q.) ∈ P }. Furthermore,
since Y belongs to JU KSE, Y ∗ = (L ∩ at(P), L ∩ at(P)) also belongs there.
We proceed by contradiction: Suppose that Z(p) = U for some atom p with (p.) ∈ P.
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Then p ∈ L \K, p ∈ at(P) and p ∈ J and we reach a conflict because Y ∗ <XW Y follows
by Lemma 43 from the fact that
[(L ∩ at(P))÷ J ] \ [(L ∩ at(P))÷ J ] = ∅
( { p } ⊆ [(K ∩ at(P))÷ J ] \ [(L ∩ at(P))÷ J ] .
Lemma 55
Let P, U be programs, ⊕ a rule update operator characterised by W,  a belief update
operator characterised by W and L an interpretation. Then,
(L,L) ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE if and only if L ∈ Jκ(P)  κ(U)K .
Proof
Suppose that (L,L) ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE. Then (L,L) belongs to min(JU KSE,≤XW ) for some
X = (I, J) ∈ JP KSE. Since JP KSE is a well-defined set of SE-interpretations, we conclude
that (J, J) ∈ JP KSE and, consequently, J |= P. We will prove that L ∈ min(Jκ(U)K,≤JW).
Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. there is some L′ ∈ Jκ(U)K such that L′ <JW L. In other
words, L′ ÷ J ( L ÷ J . It follows that (L′, L′) is an SE-model of U and by Lemma 43
we conclude that (L′, L′) <XW (L,L), contrary to the assumption that (L,L) belongs to
min(JU KSE,≤XW ).
To prove the converse implication, assume that L ∈ Jκ(P)  κ(U)K. Then there is
some interpretation J with J |= P such that L ∈ min(Jκ(U)K,≤JW). It follows that X =
(J, J) ∈ JP KSE and Z = (L,L) ∈ JU KSE. Our goal is to prove that Z ∈ min(JU KSE,≤XW ).
Suppose that this is not the case, i.e. there is some Z ′ = (K ′, L′) ∈ JU KSE such that
Z ′ <XW Z. Note that since JU KSE is a well-defined set of SE-interpretations, it follows that
(L′, L′) ∈ JU KSE and thus L′ |= U . By Lemma 43, one of the following conditions is then
satisfied:
a) If L′÷ J ( L÷ J , then we obtain L′ <JW L, contrary to the assumption that L belongs
to min(Jκ(U)K,≤JW).
b) The case when L′ ÷ J = L÷ J and (K ′ ÷ J) \∆ ( (L÷ J) \∆, where ∆ = L÷ J ,
is impossible because the set (L÷ J) \∆ is empty.
Proposition 56
Let P be a set of facts, Q and U be programs such that Q ⊆ P and at(U) ⊆ at(P), ⊕ a
rule update operator characterised by W and  a belief update operator characterised by W.
Then,
P ⊕ U |=SE Q if and only if κ(P)  κ(U) |= κ(Q) .
Proof
First suppose that P⊕U |=SE Q and take some L ∈ Jκ(P)  κ(U)K. We need to prove that
L |= Q. It follows from Lemma 55 that (L,L) ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE and our assumption implies
that (L,L) |= Q. This means that L |= Q, so we reached the desired conclusion.
For the converse implication, suppose that κ(P)κ(U) |= κ(Q) and take some (K,L) ∈JP ⊕ U KSE. Our goal is to prove that (K,L) |= Q. Since the set of SE-interpretationsJP ⊕ U KSE is well-defined, we obtain that (L,L) ∈ JP ⊕ U KSE and by Lemma 55 it
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follows that L ∈ Jκ(P)  κ(U)K. By our assumption we infer that L |= Q. Thus, for every
positive fact (p.) from Q it holds that p ∈ L and due to Lemma 54 also p ∈ K. Therefore,
(K,L) |= (p.). Similarly, for every negative fact (∼p.) from Q it holds that p /∈ L and,
hence, (K,L) |= (∼p.). Consequently, (K,L) |= Q as desired.
Theorem 25 (Computational complexity of rule updates characterised by W).
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether P ⊕ U |=SE Q for
programs P, U , Q is ΠP2 -complete. Hardness holds even if P is a set of positive facts, U is
a non-disjunctive program and Q contains a single fact from P.
Proof of Theorem 25
Hardness can be shown by reducing the problem of query answering for Winslett’s belief
update semantics to the problem of query answering for ⊕. To do this, we rely on some
specifics of the proof of Theorem 6 as it is presented in (Eiter and Gottlob 1992). More
specifically, Lemma 6.2 (c.f. page 250 of (Eiter and Gottlob 1992)) shows ΠP2 -hardness of
Winslett’s belief update semantics by taking an instance
F = ∀x1, . . . , xm∃y1, . . . , yn : ν
of QBF2,∀ and constructing propositional formulae φ, µ and ψ such that
F is valid if and only if φ  µ |= ψ . (C8)
In the following we reproduce the definition of φ, µ and ψ in order to pinpoint their syn-
tactic structure. Then we show how they can be encoded as logic programs P, U and Q
such that
φ  µ |= ψ if and only if P ⊕ U |=SE Q . (C9)
However, we omit the proof of the equivalence (C8) and refer the interested reader to (Eiter
and Gottlob 1992) for further details.
Formulae φ, µ and ψ can be defined as follows:
φ = x1 ∧ · · · ∧ xm ∧ z1 ∧ · · · ∧ zm ∧ y1 ∧ · · · ∧ yn ∧ r ,
µ = (x1 ≡ ¬z1) ∧ · · · ∧ (xm ≡ ¬zm) ∧ (r ⊃ ν) ∧ ((y1 ∨ · · · ∨ yn) ⊃ r) ,
ψ = r ,
where z1, . . . , zm and r are fresh propositional variables. Moreover, we can assume with-
out loss of generality that ν is in conjunctive normal form, i.e.
ν =
s∧
i=1
(pi,1 ∨ · · · ∨ pi,ti ∨ ¬qi,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬qi,ui)
where pi,j and qi,k belong to {x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn } for all i, j, k. We construct pro-
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grams P, U and Q as follows:
P = { (xi.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m } ∪ { (zi.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m } ∪ { (yi.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n } ∪ { (r.) } ,
U = { (xi ← ∼zi.), (∼zi ← xi.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ m }
∪ { (⊥ ← ∼pi,1, . . . ,∼pi,ti , qi,1, . . . , qi,ui , r.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ s }
∪ { (r ← yi.) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n } ,
Q = { (r.) } .
It is not difficult to verify that κ(P) ≡ φ, κ(U) ≡ µ and κ(Q) ≡ ψ, so it follows from
postulate (B4) and Proposition 56 that (C9) is satisfied. Together with (C8) this implies that
query answering for rule update operators characterised by W is ΠP2 -hard.
To verify membership to ΠP2 , consider the following non-deterministic polynomial al-
gorithm with an NP oracle, analogous to the one for Winslett’s belief update seman-
tics (c.f. proof of Theorem 6.4 on page 252 in (Eiter and Gottlob 1992)): To prove that
P ⊕ U 6|=SE Q, consider only atoms from at(P) ∪ at(U) ∪ at(Q) (this can be done due
to Corollary 53), guess some SE-interpretations X and Y , check in polynomial time that
X ∈ JP KSE, Y ∈ JU KSE and Y /∈ JQKSE and invoke the NP oracle to check that there is no
Z ∈ JU KSE such that Z <XW Y .
Lemma 57
Let U be a definite program. Then for all interpretations I , J it holds that,
(I, J) ∈ JU KSE if and only if I ⊆ J ∧ I |= κ(U) ∧ J |= κ(U) .
Proof
Follows from the fact that since U is definite, UK = U for any interpretation K.
Theorem 26 (Computational complexity of definite rule updates characterised by W).
Let ⊕ be a rule update operator characterised by W. Deciding whether P ⊕ U |=SE Q for
definite programs P, U , Q is co-NP-complete. Hardness holds even if P is a set of facts
and Q contains a single fact from P.
Proof of Theorem 26
Hardness follows by reducing the co-NP-complete problem of query answering for Horn
formulae under Winslett’s belief update semantics. More specifically, Theorem 7 shows
that deciding whether φµ |= ψ, where  is a belief update operator characterised by W, is
co-NP-hard even when φ is a conjunction of objective literals, µ is a Horn formula and ψ is
one of the literals in φ. It is straightforward to construct a set of facts P, a definite program
U and a program Q containing a single fact from P such that κ(P) ≡ φ, κ(U) ≡ µ and
κ(Q) ≡ ψ. Finally, it follows from postulate (B4) and Proposition 56 that
P ⊕ U |=SE Q if and only if φ⊕ µ |= ψ ,
which concludes the proof of co-NP-hardness of query answering for ⊕.
To verify membership to co-NP, consider the following non-deterministic polynomial
algorithm, analogous to the one for Winslett’s belief update semantics for Horn formulae
(c.f. proof of Theorem 7.2 on page 259 in (Eiter and Gottlob 1992)): To prove that P ⊕
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U 6|=SE Q, consider only atoms from A′ = at(P) ∪ at(U) ∪ at(Q) (this can be done due
to Corollary 53), guess some SE-interpretations X = (I, J) and Y = (K,L) and check
in polynomial time that X ∈ JP KSE, Y ∈ JU KSE and Y /∈ JQKSE. It remains to check that
there is no SE-interpretation Z ∈ JU KSE such that Z <XW Y . This can be performed in
polynomial time by using Lemma 57 as follows: Put ∆ = L ÷ J and ∆′ = (K ÷ I) \∆
and let for every atom p,
t(p) =
{
p J |= p ;
¬p J 6|= p ; s(p) =
{
p I |= p ;
¬p I 6|= p .
It follows from Lemma 57 and from the definition of ≤XW that it suffices to verify that for
every p ∈ ∆ and every q ∈ ∆′, both of the Horn formulae
κ(U) ∧ t(p) ∧
∧
r∈A′\∆
t(r) and κ(U) ∧ s(q) ∧
∧
r∈A′\∆′
s(r)
are not satisfiable.
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